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BALANCING SORNA AND THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT: THE CASE FOR A
“RESTRICTED CIRCUMSTANCE-SPECIFIC”
APPROACH
The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) is in place to
protect the public, children especially, from sex offenders. Under SORNA,
anyone and everyone convicted of what the law defines as a “sex offense” is
required to register as a “sex offender,” providing accurate and up-to-date
information on where they live, work, and go to school. Failure to do so
constitutes a federal crime punishable by up to ten years imprisonment. But
how do federal courts determine whether a particular state-level criminal
offense constitutes a “sex offense” under SORNA? Oftentimes when doing
comparisons between state and federal law for sentencing purposes, federal
courts apply what is known as the “categorical approach,” which involves the
courts comparing the elements of the prior state-level offense to those of a
generic federal offense to determine whether there is a categorical match
between the two. But in the context of SORNA, more and more federal courts
are looking beyond the bare elements of a prior state-level conviction to the
facts underlying the conviction and using that information to determine whether
the defendant before them is indeed a “sex offender” under SORNA. This
Comment argues that, while federal sentencing courts may indeed be entitled
to look past the bare elements of the prior offense in certain SORNA cases,
looking to anything beyond facts that were already admitted by the defendant
in a prior proceeding could raise Sixth Amendment concerns. Therefore, this
Comment recommends the adoption of new approach to statutory comparison,
a “restricted circumstance-specific approach,” that would appropriately
balance those Sixth Amendment concerns with Congress’s intent that SORNA
protect the public from sex offenders.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 22, 1989, an eleven-year-old boy named Jacob Wetterling was
riding his bike along a country road in St. Joseph, Minnesota with his best friend
and younger brother when a masked man pulled up alongside them, took Jacob
at gunpoint, and ordered the other two boys to leave and not look back.1 Jacob

1. See Pam Louwagie & Jennifer Brooks, Danny Heinrich Confesses to Abducting and Killing
Jacob Wetterling, STAR TRIBUNE (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/danny-heinrichconfesses-to-abducting-and-killing-jacob-wetterling/392438361/
[https://perma.cc/67HD-UK2A];
Erik Ortiz, Man Admits to Abducting, Killing Jacob Wetterling, Missing Minnesota Boy in 1989, NBC
NEWS (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/man-admits-abducting-killing-jacobwetterling-missing-minnesota-boy-1989-n643506 [https://perma.cc/VN8T-FG5A]; William Plummer
& Margaret Nelson, A Town Prays for a Missing Son, PEOPLE (Nov. 20, 1989),
https://people.com/archive/a-town-prays-for-a-missing-son-vol-32-no-21/ [https://perma.cc/XN69BFH4].
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was never seen alive again, and his case remained unsolved for twenty-seven
years.2 In 1994, in response to several high profile attacks on children like
Jacob by individuals with prior sex offenses, Congress enacted the first national
legislation targeting sex offenders specifically, which it named the Jacob
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders
Registration Act (the Wetterling Act).3 This law mandated that states create
their own sex offender registries or else risk losing 10% of their federal
funding.4
The Wetterling Act was followed by “Megan’s Law”5 in 1996, which
required community notification about registered sex offenders in addition to
the Wetterling Act’s registration requirements.6 Megan’s Law’s namesake was
a seven-year-old girl named Megan Kanka who was sexually assaulted and
murdered by a neighbor with two prior convictions for sex offenses.7
Concerned that too many sex offenders were falling through the cracks
when they crossed state lines, Congress ultimately passed the Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (the AWA) to create “a comprehensive
national system for the registration of [sex] offenders”8 The AWA, like its
predecessors, was named for a child victim of a violent crime—Adam Walsh,
a six-year-old boy abducted and murdered in 1981.9 This law was enacted with
2. In 2016, a long-time suspect in Jacob’s disappearance confessed to murdering Jacob and led
the police to Jacob’s grave as part of a plea deal for unrelated child pornography charges. See, e.g.,
Louwagie & Brooks, supra note 1.
3. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration Act,
Pub. L. No. 103–322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000),
repealed by Pub. L. No. 109–248, Title I, § 129(a), 120 Stat. 600 (July 27, 2006)); see also Wayne A.
Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Past, Present, and Future, 34 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 5–6 (2008).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (repealed July 27, 2006).
5. Id.
6. Wayne A. Logan, Challenging the Punitiveness of “New-Generation” SORN Laws, 21 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 426, 434 (2018). This law also threatened states with a loss of 10% of federal funding
for noncompliance. Id.
7. See Caroline Louise Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and
Substantive Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89, 92 (1996); see also John G. Malcolm, The
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act: A Sensible and Workable Law that Helps Keep Us
Safe, 13 ENGAGE 53, 53 (2012) (noting that the fact that Megan’s neighbor had prior convictions for
sex offenses “was known to law enforcement but not by the community”).
8. 34 U.S.C. § 20901 (2017).
9. See Malcolm, supra note 7, at 53. Adam’s father, John, later became famous for hosting the
television series America’s Most Wanted. See Olivia B. Waxman, The U.S. Is Still Dealing with the
Murder of Adam Walsh, TIME (Aug. 10, 2016), https://time.com/4437205/adam-walsh-murder/
[https://perma.cc/2PNZ-W5AR].
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the express purpose of “protect[ing] the public from sex offenders and offenders
against children.”10
To help effectuate the AWA’s purposes, Congress passed the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) as Title I of the Adam Walsh Act,11
which created requirements for sex offenders to register where they live, work,
and go to school.12 Furthermore, it created a mechanism to enforce SORNA’s
registration requirements—18 U.S.C. § 2250—which makes it a crime
punishable up to ten years imprisonment for any “sex offender” to “travel[] in
interstate or foreign commerce” but “knowingly fail[] to register or update” his
SORNA registration.13
When determining whether a criminal defendant’s prior state conviction
constitutes a “sex offense” under SORNA, thus requiring registration, courts
look to the elements of the prior crime and compare them to the elements of
generic crimes covered by the federal statute.14 Under this “categorical”
approach, if the statute of conviction shares the same elements or defines the
crime more narrowly than the generic federal statute, there exists a categorical
match between the two.15 The underlying offense then constitutes a sex offense
and triggers the SORNA registration requirements (as well as the penalties that
follow should the defendant have failed to satisfy those requirements).16 But if
the statute of conviction covered is broader than its generic counterpart, then it
will not serve as a SORNA predicate.17 The categorical approach is not only
applied to determine whether the underlying offense constituted a sex offense
under SORNA but also, if it did, how long the defendant is required to register
under SORNA and what the defendant’s base offense level for sentencing
purposes is.18

10. 34 U.S.C. § 20901.
11. Lori McPherson, Practitioner’s Guide to the Adam Walsh Act, 20 UPDATE 1, 1 (2007); see
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 590 (July 27, 2006)
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 16901).
12. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(a).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2016).
14. Bonnie Kane, SORNA: A Primer, 59 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 43, 44 (2011).
15. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.
575, 600 (1990).
16. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599.
17. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 260–61.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 2018 WL 3325909, *6, *9 (E.D. Wis. 2018).

HOWARD_22MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

SORNA AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

5/22/2020 9:55 PM

1569

A key rule for sentencing courts applying the categorical approach is that
they may only look to the elements of the prior conviction to determine if it
constitutes a SORNA predicate; the categorical approach precludes any inquiry
into the facts underlying the prior conviction.19
Despite this restriction, several U.S. Courts of Appeals have held that, when
sentencing a defendant for failing to comply with SORNA, sentencing courts
may sometimes employ a “circumstance-specific approach,” which permits
them to look beyond the prior offense’s elements to the facts underlying that
offense.20 However, as the Supreme Court has cautioned, allowing sentencing
courts to make “findings of fact that properly belong to juries” poses “practical
difficulties and potential unfairness” as well as Sixth Amendment concerns.21
The Supreme Court has developed the rules governing the categorical
approach and its alternatives, but it has not yet applied any of these approaches
in a SORNA case.22 However, the Court’s precedent indicates that a court
should apply three factors to determine if it must apply a strict categorical
approach or is free to pursue a circumstance-specific inquiry when sentencing
a sex offender for violating SORNA.23 First, courts should examine the
statutory text and legislative history of SORNA to determine whether Congress
intended for courts to stick to a strict element-to-element analysis (i.e., the
categorical approach) or whether it intended for courts to consider the
defendant’s actual conduct underlying any prior convictions.24 Second, courts
should take into account the practical difficulties with a circumstance-specific
approach.25 Finally, courts should determine whether the Sixth Amendment is
implicated by the proceeding,26 which would prevent courts from considering
19. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261.
20. See generally United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that courts
may conduct a fact-based inquiry to determine whether the defendant’s conduct met a sentencing
enhancement exception); United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1135 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that
courts may look at the facts underlying the prior conviction “for the limited purpose of determining the
victim’s age”); United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that courts may
examine the “underlying facts of a defendant’s offense, to determine whether a defendant has
committed a ‘specified offense against a minor’”); United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d 982,
993–94 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that SORNA’s legislative history permits courts to consider the age of
the victim, even if that is not an element of the underlying offense).
21. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267.
22. See infra Part III. At the same time, these approaches have been applied by several U.S.
Courts of Appeals in SORNA cases in the years since Congress enacted SORNA. See infra Part IV.
23. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267–70; Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–01 (1990).
24. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267–70; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–01.
25. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267.
26. Id.
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any facts other than that of a prior conviction or those admitted by the defendant
to increase the maximum statutory penalty the defendant faces.27
After reviewing these three factors, this Comment will argue that Congress
in some instances intended for courts to consider the facts underlying a sex
offender’s prior conviction when sentencing them for violating SORNA’s
requirements.28 However, this Comment also argues that Sixth Amendment
concerns and practical considerations suggest that sentencing courts should
only be able to consult a limited class of documents, such as a plea deal or plea
colloquy, under this analysis.29 And, furthermore, the only facts that the court
will be able to use from those documents must be those admitted by the
defendant.30
Part II of this Comment provides additional background information on
SORNA, including the three different “tiers” used to classify sex offenders and
the sentencing consequences faced by tier I, II, and III offenders.31 Part III
discusses (1) the categorical approach and its two alternatives; (2) the modified
categorical approach and the circumstance-specific approach; and (3) the rules
governing the application of each approach.32 Part IV surveys the decisions by
several U.S. Courts of Appeals to permit the use of the circumstance-specific
approach to discover certain facts for the purposes of tier classification and
sentencing of sex offenders under SORNA.33 Finally, Part V analyzes
SORNA’s text and legislative history, the practical concerns with employing a
circumstance-specific in this context, and whether the Sixth Amendment is
implicated in SORNA prosecutions.34
This Comment suggests that none of the three current approaches for
statutory comparison effectively reconcile Congress’s intent that the law “cast
a wide net to ensnare as many offenders against children as possible”35 with the
Sixth Amendment concerns at issue here.36 As a result, this Comment
27. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 490 (2000); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999).
28. See infra Section V.A.
29. See infra Section V.D.
30. See infra Section V.D.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Part IV.
34. See infra Part V.
35. United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010).
36. See infra Section V.C.
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recommends that a new, unique approach to statutory comparison should be
applied in this context, which this Comment dubs a “restricted circumstancespecific approach.”37 Such an approach would permit sentencing courts to
examine the facts underlying the defendant’s prior conviction but only those
that were admitted by the defendant in certain “Shepard documents” making
up the formal record of conviction.38
II. BACKGROUND OF SORNA
SORNA serves to assist federal and local authorities in “monitoring and
tracking sex offenders following their release into the community.”39 To do so,
it requires sex offenders to provide personal information to the authorities
regarding their identification and where they can be found at all times. The law
requires the following information to be included in the registry: the sex
offender’s name; their Social Security number; their home address; the name
and address of their workplace; the name and address of where they will be a
student; their license plate number and a description of any vehicle they owns
or operates; information about any planned trips abroad; and “[a]ny other
information required by the Attorney General.”40
On top of all that, the following additional information on a sex offender
must be included in the registry: their physical description; “[t]he text of the
provision of law defining the criminal offense for which the sex offender is
registered”; their criminal history; a current photograph of the sex offender; a
set of their fingerprints and palm prints; a DNA sample; a copy of their driver
license or ID card; and, again, “[a]ny other information required by the
Attorney General.”41 A sex offender’s failure to register or update his
registration when traveling across state lines or abroad is a federal crime,
punishable by up to ten years imprisonment.42
37. See infra Section V.D.
38. See infra Section V.D. These documents are referred to as “Shepard documents” after
Shepard v. United States, and they are a purposely limited class of documents that includes “the
statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any
explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.” Shepard v. United States,
544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005); see also Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009).
39. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/sex-offender-registration-and-notification-act-sorna
[https://perma.cc/S8CG-J3UF].
40. 34 U.S.C. § 20914(a)(1)–(8) (2017).
41. Id. § 20914(b)(1)–(8).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)–(b) (2016). But the law does provide an affirmative defense for a sex
offender, provided that all the following circumstances are met: the offender was prevented from
complying with the registration requirements due to an “uncontrollable circumstance[]”; that
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SORNA places sex offenders into three tiers,43 and each offender’s specific
tier designation is determined based on “the seriousness of their underlying sex
offense.”44 When a sex offender is being prosecuted in federal court for failing
to register under SORNA, the court determines both how long that defendant
was required to register and the base level of the defendant’s sentencing range
by looking at the defendant’s tier classification.45 Each tier classification
carries with it a progressively longer registration period—tier I offenders must
keep their registrations current for fifteen years, tier II offenders for twenty-five
years, and tier III offenders for life.46
The tier classifications also correlate to “base offense levels” for sentencing
purposes.47 A tier I sex offender has a base offense level of 12 when convicted
under § 2250(a).48 A tier II offender has a base offense level of 14,49 and tier
III offender has a base offense level of 16.50 A sex offender’s offense level,
along with other sentencing factors, helps determine how much prison time he
faces upon conviction.51 When only looking to the base offense levels that
correspond to each tier—without considering any other factors that might
increase or decrease the offender’s ultimate criminal sentence—a tier I sex
offender faces a maximum of sixteen months’ imprisonment, a tier II sex
offender faces a maximum of twenty-one months, and a tier III sex offender
faces a maximum of twenty-seven months.52
A tier III offender is one “whose offense is punishable by imprisonment for
more than 1 year and . . . is comparable to or more severe than . . . aggravated
sexual abuse or sexual abuse . . . or abusive sexual contact . . . against a minor
who has not attained the age of 13 years . . . or an attempt or conspiracy to
circumstance was not created by the offender “in reckless disregard of the intent to comply”; and the
offender “complied as soon as such circumstances ceased to exist.” Id. § 2250(c).
43. 34 U.S.C. § 20911(2)–(4) (2017).
44. United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1129 (10th Cir. 2015).
45. See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5 (2016).
46. 34 U.S.C. § 20915(a)(1)–(3).
47. See U.S.S.G § 2A3.5(a)(1)–(3).
48. Id. § 2A3.5(a)(3).
49. Id. § 2A3.5(a)(2).
50. Id. § 2A3.5(a)(1).
51. See id. § 2A3.5.
52. See id. § 2A3.5. Of course, the offender’s sentence can be adjusted based on other factors,
but these are the consequences sex offenders face at their base offense level for each tier. 18
U.S.C. § 2250 (2016). And, again, a sex offender can be imprisoned for up to ten years for a violation
of § 2250(a). Id. § 2250(a).
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commit such an offense.”53 The listed offenses—aggravated sexual abuse,
sexual abuse, and abusive sexual contact against a minor under the age of
thirteen—are all described in separate statutory sections, which can be
consulted to determine if the underlying offense of conviction is indeed
“comparable to or more severe than” any of them.54 Also included under the
tier III classification are those whose underlying offenses “involve[d]
kidnapping of a minor,” so long as the offender was not the minor’s parent or
guardian, or those whose offense “occur[ed] after the offender [became] a tier
II sex offender.”55 Ostensibly, Congress sought to keep individuals convicted
of tier III offenses on a significantly shorter leash than tier I or II offenders,
generally requiring them to keep their SORNA registrations current for the
remainder of their lives once they are released into the community.56
A sex offender is a tier II offender if his underlying offense is punishable
by imprisonment for greater than a year and falls into one of three categories.57
The first category is for those whose underlying offense is comparable to or
more severe than several listed offenses committed against a minor, which
include “sex trafficking,” “coercion and enticement,” “transportation with
intent to engage in criminal sexual activity,” and “abusive sexual contact.”58
The second category covers underlying offenses that involve “use of a minor in
a sexual performance,” “solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution,” or
“production or distribution of child pornography.”59 The third category of tier
II offenders covers those whose offense “occurs after the offender has become
a tier I sex offender.”60
As can be noted based on the above information, an underlying offense that
is comparable to or more severe than “abusive sexual contact” as defined by 18
U.S.C. § 2244 can lead to a sex offender being designated either a tier III
offender or a tier II offender.61 The key distinguishing factor between the
“abusive sexual contact” that renders a sex offender a tier III offender versus a

53. 34 U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A) (2017).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 20911(4)(B)–(C).
56. See id. § 20915(a)(3).
57. Id. § 20911(3).
58. Id. § 20911(3)(A)(i)–(iv).
59. Id. § 20911(3)(B)(i)–(iii).
60. Id. § 20911(3)(C).
61. See id. § 20911(3)(A)(iv) (abusive sexual contact with regards to
offenders); § 20911(4)(A)(ii) (abusive sexual contact with regards to tier III offenders).

tier

II
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tier II offender is the age of the victim of the underlying offense.62 For one to
be a tier III offender because his underlying sex offense constituted abusive
sexual contact, the victim must have been under the age of thirteen.63 The
victim need only be a minor for the offender to be designated a tier II offender.64
According to the statute, a “minor” is an “an individual who has not attained
the age of 18 years.”65 Thus, with regard to an offense that is comparable to or
more severe than abusive sexual contact as described in § 2244, the offender
will be a tier II offender if the victim was between the ages of thirteen and
seventeen and a tier III offender if the victim was under the age of thirteen.
A tier I sex offender is defined concisely by the statute as “a sex offender
other than a tier II or tier III sex offender.”66 Additionally, the statute defines
“sex offender” equally as concisely, stating that a sex offender is “an individual
who was convicted of a sex offense.”67 By “sex offense,” the statute is referring
to criminal offenses that have “an element involving a sexual act or sexual
contact with another,” those that are “specified offense[s] against a minor,”68
certain types of federal offenses, certain types of military offenses, or an
attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the above.69 Criminal offenses covered
by this statute include any “[s]tate, local, tribal, foreign, or military
offense . . . or other criminal offense.”70
62. See id. § 20911(3)(A)(iv) (abusive sexual contact with regards to tier II
offenders); § 20911(4)(A)(ii) (abusive sexual contact with regards to tier III offenders).
63. Id. § 20911(4)(A)(ii).
64. Id. § 20911(3)(A)(iv).
65. Id. § 20911(14).
66. Id. § 20911(2).
67. Id. § 20911(1).
68. Id. § 20911(5)(A)(i)–(ii). Specified offenses against a minor include any that are committed
against a minor and involve kidnapping, false imprisonment, “[s]olicitation to engage in sexual
conduct . . . [or] to practice prostitution,” “[u]se in a sexual performance,” “[v]ideo voyeurism,”
possession of child pornography, production of child pornography, distribution of child pornography,
“[c]riminal sexual conduct involving a minor,” “the use of the internet to facilitate or attempt” sexual
conduct involving a minor, or “[a]ny conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.”
Id. § 20911(7)(A)–(I).
69. Id. § 20911(5)(A)(i)–(v). The Federal offenses described that may constitute sex offenses
under this statute include certain types of offenses committed within Indian country as well as
“[d]omestic assault by an habitual offender” committed “within the special maritime or territorial
jurisdiction of the United States or Indian country,” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 117 (2014). The military
offenses included under this statute are those specified in Pub. L. No. 105–119, § 115(a)(8)(C)(i), 111
Stat. 2440 (1997).
70. 34 U.S.C. § 20911(6).
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III. THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH VS. ITS ALTERNATIVES
In comparing a state statute of conviction to a generic federal statute, courts
will take one of three general approaches. The first approach is the narrowest
and is variously referred to as the “formal categorical approach,” the “elementscentric” approach, or simply the categorical approach.71 This approach calls
for an element-to-element comparison between the two statutes to determine if
there is a “categorical match” between the two statutes.72 The second approach
is known as the “modified categorical approach.”73 Under this approach, courts
must still look to the elements of both statutes (federal and state), but they may
also consult a limited class of “extra-statutory materials” from the state-level
proceedings.74 The third approach is known as the “circumstance-specific”
approach.75 A court using this approach may look beyond both the bare
elements of the state statute and the limited class of documents it would be
permitted to review under the modified approach and examine “the facts and
circumstances underlying an offender’s conviction.”76 In other words, when
applying the broader circumstance-specific approach, courts are less
constrained by what they may review when comparing a state statute to a
generic federal statute.
The Supreme Court has developed the rules governing the application of
the categorical approach, often in cases involving the Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA)77 but also with cases regarding the Gun Control Act of 196878 and
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).79 A key distinction to be made at
the outset is the difference between elements and facts:
“Elements” are the “constituent parts” of a crime’s legal
71. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261, 267 (2013).
72. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013).
73. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257, 260–63.
74. Id. at 263.
75. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34 (2009).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2247–48 (2016); Descamps, 570 U.S. at
254, 277–78; Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,
600–01 (1990).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 418 (2009).
79. See, e.g., Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 29, 43. All of these contexts—ACCA, the Gun Control Act
of 1968, and INA—resemble SORNA cases in that they involve comparing a defendant’s prior state
offense of conviction to a generic federal offense listed in the relevant statutory scheme to determine
if there exists a categorical match. See infra Section III.A. And ACCA in particular resembles SORNA
because both schemes involve imposing federal sentence enhancements based on prior state offenses.
See infra Section III.A. Therefore, ACCA cases provide a useful context for analyzing issues relating
to statutory comparison in SORNA cases. See infra Part V.
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definition—the things that the “prosecution must prove to
sustain a conviction.” At a trial, they are what the jury must
find beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the defendant, and
at a plea hearing, they are what the defendant necessarily
admits when he pleads guilty. Facts, by contrast, are mere real
world
things—extraneous
to
the
crime’s
legal
requirements. . . . They are “circumstances[s]” or “event[s]”
having no “legal effect [or] consequence”: In particular, they
need neither be found by a jury nor admitted by a defendant.80
This distinction—elements vs. facts—is important because it forms the line
of what things a court may look at when comparing statutes under different
approaches. The narrower the approach employed, the less the court may
review when deciding if a defendant’s prior offense categorically matches the
generic federal counterpart.
A. The Categorical Approach
The categorical approach has been most commonly used in the context of
ACCA, which operates to enhance the sentences of certain criminal defendants
in federal court based on their past state offenses.81 Similar to how SORNA
operates with regard to sex offenders and certain state-level sex offenses,
ACCA only applies when the defendant’s underlying state offenses are of a
certain type.82 For example, ACCA operates to punish certain federal
defendants being convicted in federal court on gun charges when they have
three prior convictions for “a violent felony or a serious drug offense.”83 And
like SORNA, ACCA then provides specific definitions for “violent felony” and
“serious drug offense.”84
When comparing a generic federal statute to an underlying state statute of
conviction, the categorical approach requires courts to look only to the elements
of the defendant’s prior offense.85 Then the court endeavors to compare those
state elements to the elements of the generic federal offense.86 If the two
80. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248 (citations omitted).
81. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257.
82. See id.; see also Taylor, 495 U.S. at 577–78.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).
84. Id. § 924(e)(2), amended by First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–391, § 401(a)(1), 132
Stat. 5220 (2018).
85. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257, 261.
86. Id. at 257; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, CATEGORICAL APPROACH PRIMER 1, 5–6
(2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2017_Categorical_Approach.pdf
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statutes have identical elements, then there is a categorical match between
them.87 If the defendant is a sex offender in federal court due to a SORNA
violation, the prior offense will then serve as a SORNA predicate.88
Additionally, the same result will follow if the state statute defines the crime of
conviction more narrowly than its federal counterpart because anyone
convicted under that state law will be “guilty of all the [federal offense’s]
elements.”89
The elements remain the focus of this inquiry. Courts applying the
categorical approach will not be permitted to examine any of the underlying
facts of conviction.90 Therefore, if the state statute of conviction is broader in
scope than its generic federal counterpart, there will be no categorical match
and the underlying state offense will not constitute a SORNA predicate.91
Without question, there may be instances where the defendant actually
committed the generic federal offense and was convicted of doing so at the state
level, but because the state statute is broader than its federal counterpart, a court
employing a strict categorical approach will nevertheless conclude that there is
not a categorical match between the two statutes.92 A strict categorical
approach, therefore, is a purposefully limited inquiry.
When writing in the context of ACCA, the Supreme Court has provided
three reasons in support of the use of a strict categorical approach.93 The first
reason offered was premised on ACCA’s text and legislative history.94 The
Court found that the text “generally supports the inference that Congress
intended the sentencing court to look only to the fact that the defendant had
been convicted of crimes falling within certain categories, and not to the facts
underlying the prior convictions.”95 Further, the statute’s legislative history

[https://perma.cc/5CDT-DN5E] (explaining that the categorical approach involves four steps: first, the
court must “identify the [statutory] definition at issue;” second, the court must “determine the statute
of conviction;” third, the court “list[s] the elements of the statute of conviction;” and finally, the court
“[c]ompare[s] the elements in the statute of conviction to those in the definition”).
87. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257.
88. A predicate offense is “[a]n earlier offense that can be used to enhance a sentence levied for
a later conviction.” Predicate Offense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The earlier
offense in SORNA cases is thus the state sex offense conviction.
89. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261.
90. Id.
91. United States v. Walker, 2018 WL 3325909, *6–7 (E.D. Wis. 2018).
92. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016).
93. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267; Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–01 (1990).
94. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–01.
95. Id. at 600.
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“show[ed] that Congress generally took a categorical approach to predicate
offenses.”96
Another rationale that the Court articulated for the categorical approach is
that “the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach are
daunting.”97 As explained by the Court,
In case after case, sentencing courts following [a factual
approach] would have to expend resources examining (often
aged) documents for evidence that a defendant admitted in a
plea colloquy, or a prosecutor showed at trial, facts that,
although unnecessary to the crime of conviction, satisfy an
element of the relevant generic offense. The meaning of those
documents will often be uncertain. And the statements of fact
in them may be downright wrong. A defendant, after all, often
has little incentive to contest facts that are not elements of the
charged offense—and may have good reason not to. At trial,
extraneous facts and arguments may confuse the jury. (Indeed,
the court may prohibit them for that reason.) And during plea
hearings, the defendant may not wish to irk the prosecutor or
court by squabbling over superfluous factual allegations.98
What’s more, federal courts are already overburdened, and requiring them
to engage in factual inquiries for the purposes of statutory comparison would
only serve to further pile on to their caseloads.99
Finally, employing anything other than a strict categorical approach could
raise Sixth Amendment concerns.100 Chiefly, the issue would be whether an
alternative approach allows a court to abridge the defendant’s right to a jury
trial by allowing the court to engage in fact-finding inquiries that are squarely
the province of the jury.101 The Supreme Court has held that “[o]ther than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt”102 or otherwise must be admitted by the
96. Id. at 601 (“If Congress had meant to adopt an approach that would require the sentencing
court to engage in an elaborate factfinding process regarding the defendant’s prior offenses, surely this
would have been mentioned somewhere in the legislative history.”).
97. Id.
98. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 270.
99. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2263 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
100. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 269 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
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defendant.103 Therefore, by looking beyond the bare elements of a defendant’s
prior conviction and examining the facts underlying it when sentencing a
defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 2250, a court may be butting up against the
protections of the Sixth Amendment.
B. The Modified Categorical Approach
The modified categorical approach is a slight variation of the strict
categorical approach. This approach should only be employed by a court when
the underlying statute of conviction is divisible,104 or lists one or more of its
elements in the alternative (i.e., “comprises multiple, alternative versions of the
crime”).105 When a court needs to compare a defendant’s divisible statute of
conviction to a generic federal offense for sentencing purposes, that court will
be entitled to employ the modified categorical approach to do so.106 Such an
approach would permit that court to review a limited set of materials to help it
determine which alternative element “formed the basis of the defendant’s
The documents that the court may consult in these
conviction.”107
circumstances include so-called “Shepard documents”108—”the statutory
definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea
colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the
defendant assented.”109 Without the benefit of consulting these “extra-statutory
documents,” the court may be unable to determine whether the statute of
conviction and the federal statute are a categorical match.110 But again, this

103. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004).
104. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 258, 278. A divisible statute can be defined as one “in which
multiple types of conduct are criminal, but only some qualify for a sentence enhancement . . . [or] ‘a
statute that sets out different offenses within one statute.’” Stephanie Marie Toribio, Note, Effective
Criminal Sentencing?: Analyzing the Effectiveness of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Career
Offenders, 22 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 377, 394 (2016) (quoting U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
2016
ANNUAL
NATIONAL
SEMINAR:
CATEGORICAL
APPROACH
(2016),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/annual-national-trainingseminar/2016/backgrounder_categorical-approach.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T3P-WQWF]).
105. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257, 262.
106. Id. at 278.
107. Id. at 257, 263.
108. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 86, at 4.
109. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005). Again, these documents are referred to
as “Shepard documents” after Shepard v. United States, where the Supreme Court limited sentencing
courts’ examinations of divisible statutes to this limited class of documents in ACCA. Nijhawan v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009) (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26; Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,
602 (1990)).
110. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 263.
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approach may only be employed by courts in that “narrow range of cases” when
courts are comparing statutes and confronted with a divisible statute.111
To further illustrate that this approach should only be applied in rare
situations, the Supreme Court emphasized that the modified categorical is a
“tool for implementing the categorical approach,” rather than an exception to
that approach.112 The modified categorical approach simply allows the court to
determine which elements in a divisible statute formed the basis of the
defendant’s prior conviction.113 If it can identify those elements based on
documents such as the indictment or the jury instructions, then from there
onward the court employs a strict categorical approach, comparing those
elements to the elements of the generic federal statute.114 Once the court
identifies which of the alternative elements formed the basis of the defendant’s
conviction, it cannot consult any extra-statutory materials moving forward; it
must stick to the elemental approach.115 Any other factual inquiries would be
impermissible under the modified categorical approach.116
C. The Circumstance-Specific Approach
The circumstance-specific (or non-categorical) approach permits a court to
“look to the facts and circumstances underlying an offender’s conviction” in
those situations where the statutory provision at issue “refer[s] to the specific
way in which an offender committed the crime on a specific occasion.”117 In
order to determine whether it may apply the circumstance-specific approach, a
court should determine if the provision contains “qualifying language” that
refers to the conduct or circumstances surrounding the commission of a specific
offense.118 In other words, the key question is whether the provision contained
language that invokes the specific facts underlying the prior offense, as opposed
to the bare elements of the offense. For example, in Nijhawan v. Holder, an
immigration case in which the Supreme Court approved the use of
circumstance-specific approach, the Court reasoned that the statutory language
at issue was “consistent with a circumstance-specific approach” because the
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 261; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
Descamps, 570 U.S. at 262–63.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 263–64.
Id.
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34 (2009).
Id. at 38–40.

HOWARD_22MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

SORNA AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

5/22/2020 9:55 PM

1581

relevant language (the phrase “in which”) “refer[red] to the conduct involved
‘in’ the commission of the offense of conviction, rather than to the elements of
the offense.”119
Should a court decide that the statutory language at issue calls for a noncategorical interpretation, that court will then be able to look beyond the prior
offense’s bare elements and instead examine the facts underlying the offense to
determine if it constitutes a sex offense for the purposes of SORNA.120 An
important question to consider here is what, exactly, the court could consult to
find these facts, i.e., what types of sentencing-related documents. This
determination might be impacted by whether the court is confronted with a
criminal proceeding or a civil proceeding, which involve different evidentiary
burdens. Nijhawan involved a civil deportation proceeding, rather than a
criminal proceeding, an important distinction noted by the Court.121 Because
of the different burdens that must be met by the government in each proceeding
(“clear and convincing” vs. “beyond a reasonable doubt”), the Court reasoned
that a court in a civil proceeding would not be limited to the same class of
documents as it would when employing a modified categorical approach in a
criminal proceeding—i.e., the charging document, plea colloquy, plea
agreement, jury instructions, or a comparable judicial record.122 Rather, an
immigration judge could rely upon “earlier sentencing-related material” as long
as the underlying fact could be shown by clear and convincing evidence.123
Other federal immigration cases that followed Nijhawan have expounded upon
what exactly constitutes this “earlier sentencing-related material,” finding that
documents such as affidavits of probable cause, police reports, criminal
complaints, or pre-sentencing reports fit the bill.124
However, if a court applies the circumstance-specific approach in the
SORNA context, the reasoning in Nijhawan suggests that the court’s factual
inquiry should be limited to the Shepard documents making up the record of

119. Id. at 38–39 (emphasis in original).
120. Kane, supra note 14, at 44.
121. See Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42.
122. See id. at 35, 41.
123. Id. at 42–43.
124. See Bianco v. Holder, 624 F.3d 265, 273 (5th Cir. 2010); Matter of H. Estrada, 26 I&N Dec.
749, 753–54 (BIA 2016), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Thomas, 27 I&N Dec. 674, 2019
WL 5546810 (U.S. Atty. Gen. Oct. 25, 2019); Michael R. Devitt, Improper Deportation of Legal
Permanent Residents: The U.S. Government’s Mischaracterization of the Supreme Court’s Decision
in Nijhawan v. Holder, 15 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1, 34–36 (2013); Kelly Morgan, Comment,
Circumstances Requiring Safeguards: Limitations on the Application of the Categorical Approach in
Hernandez-Zavala v. Lynch, 58 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 243, 262 (2017).
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conviction.125 This “evidentiary list” was developed in Shepard and other
ACCA cases for the purpose of “determining which statutory phrase (contained
within a statutory provision that covers several different generic crimes)
covered a prior conviction.”126 This is the very same sort of statutory
comparison that a court undertakes in SORNA cases.127 As a result, even if a
SORNA case arises where a court may be permitted to employ the
circumstance-specific approach to assess the defendant’s conduct, that court
should limit its analysis to any Shepard documents available.
IV. THE CONSENSUS DEVELOPING AT THE CIRCUIT LEVEL
While the Supreme Court has provided the general rules governing the use
of the categorical approach and its alternatives, it has not yet spoken on the
application of these approaches in the context of SORNA. However, several
U.S. Courts of Appeals have directly addressed the applicability of the
categorical approach in SORNA cases and carved out several scenarios where
courts may depart from the strict categorical approach and apply the
circumstance-specific approach.
Several Courts of Appeals have concluded that a court can examine the
facts underlying a prior conviction for determining the age of the victim of that
prior offense when prosecuting a sex offender for a SORNA violation.128 Of
these, the Tenth Circuit has held that the use of the circumstance-specific
approach should be restricted to only determining this one fact, “a single fact
that is easy to prove and, in an ordinary case, not easily disputed.”129 But the
reasoning in several other U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions does not suggest
such limitations. Rather, these decisions have noted that SORNA often speaks
in fact-specific language or uses fact-based qualifiers that refer to how an
offense was committed, and because this textual language clearly speaks to
conduct as opposed to the elements of a prior conviction, its use should signal

125. See Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 41.
126. Id. (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005); Taylor v. United States, 495
U.S. 575, 602 (1990)).
127. United States v. Taylor, 644 F.3d 573, 576 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5 (2016))
(noting that in sentencing a defendant for violating SORNA, the sentencing judge will “determine the
defendant’s tier classification . . . by examining the elements of the statute under which the defendant
was convicted.”).
128. See infra Section III.A.
129. United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1135 (10th Cir. 2015).
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that Congress is calling for the use of a circumstance-specific approach in
analyzing it.130
A. Limiting the Reach of the Circumstance-Specific Approach in SORNA
Cases: The Tenth Circuit in United States v. White
The age of the victim of a sex offender’s underlying offenses in SORNA
cases can be important to determine (a) whether the victim was a minor and (b)
whether the defendant qualifies as tier II or a tier III sex offender. Recall,
SORNA characterizes a “minor” as “an individual who has not attained the age
of 18 years.”131 Further, a sex offender will be classified as a tier II offender if
he commits one of several offenses listed in the statute “against a minor” (i.e.,
against someone less than eighteen years of age)132 or if his crime involved
either the “use of a minor in a sexual performance”133 or the “solicitation of a
minor to practice prostitution.”134 Therefore, whether a sex offender is either a
tier I or tier II sex offender in many instances may depend on the age of the
victim—i.e., whether the victim was less than eighteen years of age.
Additionally, the age of the victim can be important in determining whether
a sex offender is a tier III offender as well. If the underlying sex offense
involved “abusive sexual contact . . . against a minor who has not attained the
age of 13 years,” the sex offender should then be properly classified as a tier III
offender.135 “[A]busive sexual contact” can also constitute a tier II offense,136
but the victim need only be a minor,137 not a minor under thirteen years old.
Therefore, one will be a tier II offender if he commits abusive sexual contact
against a victim who is at least thirteen years old and under eighteen years, but
the sex offender will be a tier III offender if the victim is under the age of
thirteen. Because a sex offender will face different registration requirements as
well as different sentencing consequences for failure to register based on his

130. See United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Price, 777
F.3d 700, 708–09 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1233 (7th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Gonzalez-Medina, 757 F.3d 425, 430–31 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d
1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2010).
131. 34 U.S.C. § 20911(14) (2017).
132. See id. § 20911(3)(A) (emphasis added).
133. Id. § 20911(3)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
134. Id. § 20911(3)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
135. Id. § 20911(4)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
136. Id. § 20911(3)(A)(iv).
137. Id. § 20911(3)(A).
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tier classification,138 whether a court can look at a fact such as the victim’s age
for slotting the offender into a specific tier can have real consequences.
Although several U.S. Courts of Appeals have held that the age of the
victim is just the sort of fact that a court may use the circumstance-specific
approach to examine,139 the Tenth Circuit expressly limited the circumstancespecific inquiry solely to the age of the victim in United States v. White.140 In
White, when sentencing a defendant for failing to comply with SORNA’s
requirements, the court examined the record of the underlying state conviction
to determine the age of the victim and the nature of the offense and concluded
on these facts that the defendant was a tier III sex offender because his offense
involved “abusive sexual contact . . . against a minor who has not attained the
age of 13 years.”141 The court noted the importance of properly determining a
defendant’s tier classification, as that dictates the defendant’s offense level and
likely the ultimate length of the sentence as well.142
The Tenth Circuit noted that SORNA’s statutory language at issue in this
case, which spoke of “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of
title 18) against a minor who has not attained the age of 13 years,”143 referenced
a statutory section (i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 2244) that does not include the age of the
victim as an element of the offense.144 Therefore, the court reasoned that it must
apply the circumstance-specific approach to determine if the victim was less
than thirteen years of age.145 Otherwise, because the victim’s age was not an
element of the underlying offense, “a comparison based on the categorical
approach will never reveal the age of the victim and therefore [the underlying
offense will] never constitute a tier III offense.”146
At the same time, however, the Tenth Circuit held that the circumstancespecific approach should be limited to determining the age of the victim in
SORNA cases, at least in those provisions where “SORNA cross-references a
138. See supra Part I.
139. See United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. White, 782
F.3d 1118, 1135 (10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d 982, 993–94 (9th Cir.
2008).
140. See White, 782 F.3d at 1135.
141. Id. at 1132 (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A)(ii)).
142. Id. at 1129.
143. 34 U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A)(ii).
144. White, 782 F.3d at 1133.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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specific section of the criminal code.”147 The court stated that the factual
inquiry should be limited in this manner due to “equitable and practical
concerns” with the circumstance-specific approach.148 The court reasoned that
employing the circumstance-specific approach to simply determine the victim’s
age will avoid these issues because age “is a single fact that is easy to prove
and, in an ordinary case, not easily disputed.”149
B. A Broader Interpretation—Using the Circumstance-Specific Approach in
SORNA Cases Whenever the Text Speaks in “Fact-Specific” Language
While the Tenth Circuit in White held that the use of the circumstancespecific approach should be limited to determining a victim’s age, other U.S.
Courts of Appeals have reasoned that the circumstance-specific approach
should be employed in SORNA cases whenever the statutory text uses factspecific language that speaks to the defendant’s conduct rather than the
elements of any underlying conviction.150 These courts have employed this
reasoning to justify the use of the circumstance-specific approach not only to
determine a victim’s age but also to determine whether an underlying offense
of conviction constituted a “specified offense against a minor“151 or whether
any of SORNA’s statutory exceptions applied to a defendant’s underlying
offense.152
SORNA defines what constitutes a specified offense against a minor by
listing several offenses for comparison,153 but the last listed is “[a]ny conduct
that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor,”154 a catch-all category.155
And among its statutory exceptions, SORNA provides two such exceptions for

147. Id. at 1135.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Price, 777
F.3d 700, 708–09 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1237 (7th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Gonzalez-Medina, 757 F.3d 425, 429–30 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d
1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d 982, 992–94 (9th Cir. 2008).
151. See Price, 777 F.3d at 708; Dodge, 597 F.3d at 1355–56; Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d at 992–
94; see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PRIMER ON SEX OFFENSES: SEXUAL ABUSE AND FAILURE TO
REGISTER
OFFENSES
1,
9
(2016),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2019_Primer_Sex_Offense_Register.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q7NV-BZGS].
152. See Rogers, 804 F.3d at 1236.
153. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7) (2017).
154. Id. § 20911(7)(I).
155. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d at 988.
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“[o]ffenses involving consensual sexual conduct.”156 The first applies if the
victim was an adult and was not “under the custodial authority of the offender
at the time of the offense.”157 The second applies “if the victim was at least 13
years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim.”158
If an offense satisfies either exception, then it will not be a sex offense under
SORNA.159
The U.S. Courts of Appeals surveyed here all base their reasoning on the
Supreme Court’s instruction in Nijhawan v. Holder. Nijhawan specifies that
when the statutory language at issue “refer[s] to the conduct involved ‘in’ the
commission of the offense of conviction, rather than to the elements of the
offense,” it calls for a circumstance-specific analysis.160 They mainly agree that
the categorical approach applies to the “threshold definition of sex offense,”161
whenever the federal statute that is being compared to the underlying conviction
refers to a generic offense,162 or when the federal statute “speaks in categorical
or elements-based terms rather than ‘circumstance-specific’ terms.”163 But at
the same time, whenever Congress uses more fact-centric language in
SORNA’s text, these courts are likely to conclude that Congress is suggesting
that courts should employ a circumstance-specific approach.164 The following
cases illustrate this broader interpretation by other U.S. Courts of Appeals
outside the Tenth Circuit.
1. The Ninth Circuit: United States v. Mi Kyung Byun
The Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Mi Kyung Byun that courts may
apply the circumstance-specific approach to determine the victim’s age when
evaluating whether a defendant committed a specified offense against a
minor.165 Byun involved a defendant who imported a seventeen-year-old

156. 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(C).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38–39 (2009) (emphasis in original).
161. United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1237 (7th Cir. 2015).
162. See United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2016); see also Moncrieffe v.
Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 192 (2013); Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 34–35; United States v. Price, 777 F.3d 700,
704–05 (4th Cir. 2015).
163. Rogers, 804 F. 3d at 1236 (citing Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 36).
164. See, e.g., id. at 1236–37.
165. United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2008).
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woman into the country to work in the defendant’s club, where the seventeenyear-old was expected to engage in prostitution with some of the club’s
customers.166 Although the defendant pled guilty to three alien smuggling
offenses, she did not plead guilty to the charge of transporting a minor for
purposes of prostitution.167 However, she did admit in her plea agreement that
she induced the seventeen-year-old woman to come to Guam to engage in
prostitution and that the defendant knew at the time that this woman was
seventeen years old.168
The Ninth Circuit cited the defendant’s admissions in concluding that the
defendant committed a specified offense against a minor, reasoning that it was
permitted to do so because SORNA’s language,169 structure, and legislative
history170 allow courts to consider the underlying facts of the defendant’s
offense to determine the age of the victim.171 Therefore, the court held that the
defendant was required to register under SORNA: her plea agreement showed
that she imported a seventeen-year-old alien into Guam to engage in
prostitution, and these underlying facts were sufficient to allow the court to
conclude the defendant committed a specified offense against a minor.172
2. The Eleventh Circuit: United States v. Dodge
The Eleventh Circuit went even further in examining a defendant’s
underlying conduct to determine that he committed a specified offense against
a minor. In United States v. Dodge, the defendant, a thirty-three-year-old man,
pled guilty to transferring obscene material to a minor for emailing indecent
pictures of himself to a person who he thought to be a thirteen-year-old girl.173
While the Ninth Circuit in Byun limited its circumstance-specific inquiry to the
age of the victim, the Eleventh Circuit in Dodge asserted that Byun’s reasoning
suggested that courts may look beyond the mere elements of the prior offense
to the facts underlying the conviction to determine if a defendant committed a
166. Id. at 983.
167. Id. at 983–84.
168. Id. at 984.
169. Id. at 993 (reasoning that SORNA’s language “evidences Congress’s intent to require all
those who commit sex crimes against children to register as sex offenders”).
170. Id. at 992–93 (finding that SORNA’s legislative history “shows that Congress intended to
include all individuals who commit sex crimes against minors, not only those who were convicted
under a statute having the age of the victim as an element . . . [and] reveals substantial discussion of
the necessity of identifying all child predators”).
171. Id. at 993–94.
172. Id. at 994.
173. United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2010).
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specified offense against a minor.174 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that this
conclusion was supported by the definition of what constitutes a specified
offense against a minor (which lacks any mention of elements), the title of the
statutory section (referring to “offenses” instead of “convictions”), the use of
general, non-specific language in the statutory section (“include,” “involve[],”
“by its nature”), and the presence of the broad catch-all provision (“[a]ny
conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor”) in the list of
specified offenses against a minor.175
What’s more, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that the statutory language of
SORNA shows that Congress sought to “cast a wide net to ensnare as many
offenders against children as possible,” including those whose underlying
conduct amounted to a sex offense against a minor but ultimate conviction was
for a lesser-included offense.176 The court concluded that when it comes to
conduct that lines up with the catch-all provision of what constitutes a specified
offense against a minor,
[d]istrict judges do not need a statute to spell out every instance
of conduct that is a sexual offense against a minor. They are
capable of examining the underlying conduct of an offense and
determining whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that
“by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.”177
As revealed in the plea colloquy, the defendant’s conduct in Dodge
involved sending indecent pictures of himself to someone he believed to be a
minor.178 Although the offense for which Dodge was convicted “did not
correspond neatly to any listed ‘specified offense against a minor,’” the court
nevertheless concluded that the defendant’s conduct was “by its nature . . . a
sex offense against a minor.”179 And because the court concluded that it may
look past the elements of a prior offense to a defendant’s underlying conduct
when determining whether the defendant committed a specified offense against
a minor, the court held that this defendant did indeed commit such an offense
and was therefore a sex offender required to register under SORNA.180

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 1354.
Id. at 1354–55.
Id. at 1355.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1356.
Id.

HOWARD_22MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

SORNA AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

5/22/2020 9:55 PM

1589

3. The Fourth Circuit: United States v. Price
The Fourth Circuit followed Dodge’s lead in also concluding that courts
may employ a circumstance-specific approach in determining whether a
defendant committed a specified offense against a minor. The defendant in
United States v. Price had a prior conviction “for the common law offense of
assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature,” and he argued that this
was not a sex offense for the purposes of SORNA.181 However, the plea
colloquy for the underlying offense revealed that it involved the defendant
forcing his twelve-year-old stepdaughter to perform a sex act on him.182 The
court held that the language, structure, and “purpose of SORNA” required it to
apply a circumstance-specific approach to determine whether the defendant
committed a specified offense against a minor.183 Therefore, it was permitted
to review the facts articulated in the plea colloquy to conclude that the
defendant’s conduct underlying his prior conviction constituted a specified
offense against a minor.184
In terms of language and structure, the Fourth Circuit distinguished two
definitions of what constitutes a “sex offense” under SORNA: “a criminal
offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with
another,”185 and “a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a
minor.”186 Further, the court pointed to the catch-all provision in the list of
what constitutes a specified offense against a minor—”[a]ny conduct that by its
nature is a sex offense against a minor.”187 Unlike the first definition of a sex
offense provided in the statute, which speaks of a criminal offense with an
element involving a sexual act or sexual contact, there is no mention of
“elements” in the subsection providing that a specified offense against a minor
will constitute a sex offense, nor is the word “element” present in the catch-all
provision for what constitutes a specified offense against a minor.188 The court
found the different language Congress used telling because it suggests that
Congress intended “to cover a broader range of [conduct]” that constitutes
181. United States v. Price, 777 F.3d 700, 703 (4th Cir. 2015).
182. Id. at 707.
183. Id. at 709.
184. See id.
185. Id. at 704 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(i) (current version at 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(i)
(2017))) (emphasis added).
186. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(ii) (current version at 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(ii)
(2017))) (emphasis added).
187. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(iii) (current version at 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)(I) (2017)))
(emphasis added).
188. Id. at 708.
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specified offenses against minors than it did when it spoke to offenses
containing “an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact.”189 What’s
more, the court found that the statute’s use of the words “conduct” and by its
“nature” in Section 20911(7)(I) was key as well—these words speak “to how
an offense was committed,” requiring a court to consider the underlying facts
of the offense instead of employing a bare element-to-element, categorical
The court thus concluded that “[t]he text of
comparison.190
SORNA . . . indicates that Congress intended that the broader circumstancespecific analysis be applicable with respect to” the catch-all provision of what
constitutes a specified offense against a minor.191
With regards to SORNA’s purpose, the Fourth Circuit in Price found that
Congress’s intent in enacting SORNA “also support[ed] the use of the
circumstance-specific approach” in this case.192 Congress enacted SORNA to
“protect the public [specifically, children] from sex offenders.”193 The
provisions at issue in this case, involving specified offenses against minors,
reinforced Congress’s purpose by using “broader language in defining a ‘sex
offense’ for victims who are minors.”194 The use of this broad language shows
that Congress sought to protect all children from sex offenders and that, to
effectuate this purpose, courts should apply the circumstance-specific approach
when determining whether a defendant’s conduct underlying a prior conviction
was “by its nature . . . a sex offense against a minor.”195
4. The Fourth Circuit: United States v. Berry
Like the Tenth Circuit in White, the Fourth Circuit has held it is appropriate
to depart from the categorical approach to determine the age of a sex offender’s
victim. In United States v. Berry, a defendant who pleaded guilty to failing to
register as a sex offender challenged the district court’s determination at
sentencing that the defendant was a tier III offender.196 The district court had
made this determination after examining facts underlying the defendant’s

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 704, 708.
Id. at 709 (citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 37–39 (2009)).
Id. (citing United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1354–55 (11th Cir. 2010)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 708 n.8; see id. at 709.
United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 2016).
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original conviction.197 In determining whether a categorical or circumstancespecific approach was called for in this case, the Fourth Circuit examined the
statutory text and concluded that the text called for courts to consider “the
specific circumstance of the victim’s age” when determining an offender’s tier
classification.198
At first glance, it appears that the Fourth Circuit in Berry is entirely in
agreement with the Tenth Circuit in White that age is the only fact a sentencing
court may consider in SORNA cases.
In sum, an examination of 42 U.S.C. § 16911(4)(A)'s text and
structure leads us to the same conclusion the Tenth Circuit
reached in White: “Congress intended courts to apply a
categorical approach to sex offender tier classifications
designated by reference to a specific federal criminal statute,
but to employ a circumstance-specific comparison for the
limited purpose of determining the victim's age.”199
That being said, a close reading of the case will show that the Fourth Circuit
is only limiting itself to that fact with regards to one statutory section of
SORNA, Section 20911(4)(A)200, which lists two of four generic crimes that
render one a tier III offender under SORNA.201 Those generic crimes are
“aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as described in sections 2241 and
2242 of title 18)” and “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of
title 18) against a minor who has not attained the age of 13 years.”202
Elsewhere in the opinion, however, the Fourth Circuit discusses its prior
opinion in Price and reaffirms the holding in that case, despite declining to
extend the same approach to this section of SORNA. As the court explains, it
examined “a different, and differently-worded, SORNA subsection” in Price,
namely 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)(I), defining the term “specified offense against a
minor” as “[a]ny conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.”203
The court then quotes Price in restating that the “explicit reference to the
‘conduct’ underlying a prior offense, as well as the ‘nature’ of that conduct,

197. Id.
198. Id. at 197.
199. Id. at 197.
200. See id. While the Fourth Circuit refers to 42 U.S.C. § 16911(4)(A) in the text of the case,
these provisions were transferred to 34 U.S.C. § 20911 a little over a year after the Berry decision came
down. See 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2015).
201. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A) (2017).
202. Id. § 20911(4)(A)(i)–(ii).
203. Berry, 814 F.3d at 198 (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)(I)).

HOWARD_22MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1592

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

5/22/2020 9:55 PM

[103:1565

refers to how an offense was committed—not a generic offense.”204 That
reference to “conduct” thus allowed the Fourth Circuit to apply a circumstancespecific approach in Price.205
To put it another way, while some of the language used by the Fourth
Circuit might suggest otherwise, the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Berry is
distinguished from the Tenth Circuit’s holding in White. While the Tenth
Circuit (according to White) would only allow deviation from the categorical
approach in SORNA cases for purposes of determining a victim’s age,206 the
decision in Berry only limits courts in this manner in cases involving 28
U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A), those cases where courts are trying to determine whether
a defendant is a tier III offender by comparing his past offenses to generic
offenses described in Section 20911(4)(A)(i) and (ii).207 The Fourth Circuit
here simply held that the circumstance-specific approach could not be applied
“wholesale” to the entirety of SORNA and that, “in some cases, one can and
should determine whether a defendant was convicted of a sex offense without
looking at the factual circumstances of the prior offense.”208 But when the
situation is similar to that found in Price, which deals with other SORNA
subsections that contain language that “refers to how an offense was
committed,” rather than a “generic offense,” the circumstance-specific
approach may very well be applicable.209
5. The Seventh Circuit: United States v. Rogers
Particularly instructive for determining when to apply a circumstancespecific analysis in SORNA cases is the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Rogers.210 Rogers involved a defendant accused of sexually abusing
his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter while that defendant, already a sex offender
required to register under SORNA, was in failure-to-register status.211 He was
subsequently convicted of incest in Indiana for that offense.212 Because the trial
court found that the defendant committed a sex offense as classified under
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.
See United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1140 (10th Cir. 2015).
See Berry, 814 F. 3d at 199; see also 34 U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A)(i)–(ii).
Berry, 814 F.3d at 198–99.
Id.
804 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1234.
Id. at 1236.
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SORNA while in failure-to-register status, the defendant faced an enhanced
sentence of over eight years incarceration and twenty years of supervised
release.213 The defendant, however, argued that the “consensual sexual conduct
… [with] an adult” statutory exception should apply to prevent his Indiana
conviction from constituting a sex offense committed while he was in failureto-register status.214 He asserted that the court should apply the categorical
approach to his statute of conviction, and that, because that statute did not
contain a “consenting adult” exception similar to that in SORNA, Indiana
criminalized a broader swathe of conduct than did its federal counterpart.215
The Seventh Circuit examined the statutory language of SORNA to
conclude that, contrary to the defendant’s assertion that the court must apply
the categorical approach to the statutory exception at issue, that exception
called for a circumstance-specific approach.216 Unlike the “threshold definition
of ‘sex offense,’” which contained the word “element” and thus called for a
categorical, element-to-element analysis, the statutory exception “use[d] factspecific language, strongly suggesting that a conduct-based inquiry
applie[d].”217 This fact-specific language included “a string of fact-based
qualifiers: ‘if the victim was an adult,’ ‘unless the adult was under the custodial
authority of the offender at the time of the offense,’ ‘if the victim was at least
13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the
victim.’”218 The court held that these are all questions implicating the
underlying facts of the offense rather than the elements.219 Thus, the court
reasoned, whether the exception applied to the defendant’s conduct depended
on facts such as whether the offense involved consensual sexual conduct
between adults, and the only way for the court to determine if it did would be
to apply the circumstance-specific approach to examine the facts of the

213. Id. at 1235. Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, if a defendant is required to register
under SORNA, fails to do so, and then commits “a sex offense against someone other than a minor,”
the sentencing court will apply a six-level sentence enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(b)(1)(A) (2016).
With the combination of the defendant’s total offense level and his criminal history, he was facing 84–
105 months’ incarceration. Rogers, 804 F.3d at 1235.
214. Id. at 1236.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1237.
217. Id.
218. Id. (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(C) (2017)).
219. Id.
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offense.220 “[T]he exception’s reference to conduct, rather than elements, is
consistent with a circumstance-specific analysis.”221
C. The Increasing Reliance on the Circumstance-Specific Approach in
SORNA Cases
As illustrated by the cases surveyed above, federal courts are increasingly
turning to the circumstance-specific approach in SORNA cases. This allows
sentencing courts to go beyond a bare element-to-element comparison between
the defendant’s offense of conviction and those generic federal offenses falling
under SORNA and instead permits courts to look to the facts underlying the
conviction.222
In the most narrow reading of the caselaw surveyed here, federal courts may
apply the circumstance-specific approach to determine (1) the age of the
victim,223 (2) whether the underlying offense constituted a specified offense
against a minor,224 and (3) whether either of the statutory exceptions for
offenses involving consensual conduct apply.225 But the reasoning in the
majority of these cases suggests a broader reading: that the circumstancespecific approach should apply wherever the statutory language speaks in factspecific language that focuses on the defendant’s conduct rather than the
elements of the prior offense.226
In other words, there may be a circuit split emerging: the Tenth Circuit in
White expressly concluded that it was only permitted to employ a circumstancespecific approach to determine the age of a sex offender’s victim,227 while the
reasoning and holdings of other Courts of Appeals in cases such as Dodge,
Rogers, and Price do not reflect White’s more restrictive conclusion.228 Of the
two approaches—the restrictive minority approach suggested in White and the
220. Id.
221. Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Medina, 757 F.3d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 2014)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
222. See supra Section III.A–C
223. See supra Section IV.A.
224. See supra Section IV.B.
225. See supra Section IV.B.
226. See United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 198–99 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Price,
777 F.3d 700, 709 (4th Cir. 2015); Rogers, 804 F.3d at 1237; United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347,
1355 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2008).
227. See United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1135 (10th Cir. 2015).
228. See Price, 777 F.3d at 709; Rogers, 804 F.3d at 1236–37; White, 782 F.3d at 1135; Dodge,
597 F.3d at 1356.
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majority approach in the other cases surveyed—the majority seems more
persuasive if we factor in the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s decision
in Nijhawan v. Holder about when to apply the circumstance-specific approach
as opposed to the categorical approach.229
The key to the analysis then appears to be the use of “fact-based
qualifiers,”230 or language discussing “how an offense was committed.”231 But
as noted earlier, Nijhawan involved a civil deportation proceeding, a far
different scenario than those where a court would employ a circumstancespecific approach to determine whether a defendant’s prior offense meets the
definition of a sex offense under SORNA.232 That distinction—the civil
deportation proceeding vs. the criminal proceedings involved in these SORNA
cases—is important from a constitutional law perspective, as criminal
defendants are entitled to certain constitutional protections that civil defendants
are not, such as those provided by the Sixth Amendment. Therefore, an
important question to ask is whether courts employing a circumstance-specific
approach in SORNA cases are infringing upon the Sixth Amendment rights of
the defendants in those cases.
V. ARE FEDERAL COURTS ENTITLED TO EMPLOY A CIRCUMSTANCE-SPECIFIC
APPROACH IN SORNA CASES?
As provided by the Supreme Court, courts should look to three factors to
determine whether they should be employing a strict categorical approach when
they are engaging in statutory comparison or conversely whether they may
apply a circumstance-specific approach.233 Although these factors were
discussed with regards to ACCA,234 they translate easily to SORNA scenarios
and thus should be applied to determine which approach should be used in this
context. Therefore, the first factor examined is whether SORNA’s statutory
text and legislative history lean in favor of employing one approach over
another.235 Second, one must consider whether the “practical difficulties” of
229. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38–39 (2009) (stating that the circumstance specific
approach should be used when the statutory language “refer[s] to the conduct involved ‘in’ the
commission of the offense of conviction, rather than to the elements of the offense”) (emphasis in
original).
230. Rogers, 804 F.3d at 1237.
231. Price, 777 F.3d at 709.
232. See supra Section III.C.
233. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 267–71 (2013); Taylor v. United States, 495
U.S. 575, 600–01 (1990); see also, supra Section II.A.
234. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267–70; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–01.
235. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267–69; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–01.
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requiring a circumstance-specific approach for certain issues would be too
daunting for courts to overcome.236 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we
must ask whether allowing courts to examine a criminal defendant’s conduct
underlying his prior conviction, beyond the bare elements of that prior offense,
infringes upon the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.237
As is demonstrated in the analysis below, none of the current approaches
used by courts for statutory comparison effectively reconcile the first factor,
which leans in favor of allowing courts to employ the circumstance-specific
approach in SORNA cases, with the latter two factors, which favor the
categorical approach.238
A. SORNA’s Text and Legislative History
Congress enacted SORNA “to protect the public from sex offenders and
offenders against children, and in response to vicious attacks by violent
predators.”239 In its declaration of purpose, SORNA also names seventeen
victims of “vicious attacks by violent predators,” most of whom were under the
age of 18 when their attack occurred,240 which seems to further suggest that the
law is particularly concerned with preventing future attacks of that nature.
Important to remember is that SORNA was enacted as part of the Adam Walsh
Act, and the AWA was the culmination of over two decades’ worth of
Congressional legislation aimed at protecting the public from the threat posed
by sex offenders.241 Furthermore, to enforce its intent here, Congress also
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2250, a federal crime that could result in a sex offender’s
imprisonment for up to ten years if that sex offender failed to comply with
SORNA’s requirements.242
In enacting the AWA and SORNA, Congress appeared especially
concerned with the risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders and believed that
the best predictor of recidivism is, quite simply, a prior sex offense.243 It also
236. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267, 270–71; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601.
237. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 267, 269.
238. See infra Section V.D.
239. 34 U.S.C. § 20901 (2017).
240. Id. § 20901(1)–(17).
241. See supra Part I.
242. 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2016); see also Logan, supra note 6, at 434–35.
243. See Logan, supra note 3, at 11; see also Smith v. Doe, U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (noting that
“[t]he risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is ‘frightening and high’” (quoting McKune v. Lile,
536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002)).
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sought to establish a national registration system that would deter sex offenders
from moving to states lacking things such as sex offender registries or
community notification requirements.244 SORNA and the AWA, in addition to
their predecessors, were enacted not in a vacuum but chiefly “[i]n response to
a number of high-profile cases where egregious crimes were committed by
individuals with prior sex offense convictions—but who were not required to
register.”245
As already noted, statutory language that refers to a defendant’s conduct in
the commission of an offense, rather than the elements of that offense, suggests
to a court that it should apply a circumstance-specific approach when engaging
in statutory comparison.246 This conduct-based language can be indicated by
presence of “fact-based qualifiers” or broader statutory language referencing
how a crime was committed.247 The federal courts of appeals addressing this
topic, many of which were surveyed above, appear correct then in reading
several of SORNA’s provisions as requiring a circumstance-specific approach
to determine some underlying fact of a criminal defendant’s conduct, whether
it be the age of the defendant’s victim, whether the defendant committed a
specified offense against a minor, or whether a statutory exception applies.248
In other words, the statutory language examined by those courts surveyed does
in fact speak in that conduct-based language which the Supreme Court stated
would entitle courts to review a defendant’s conduct underlying a prior
offense.249 Therefore, the statutory language of certain provisions of SORNA
appears to permit a circumstance-specific analysis.
In terms of determining Congress’s intent behind SORNA (or any other law
it passes), the best indicator of that intent is the plain language that it writes into
the statute.250 With regards to SORNA, Congress classified certain sex offenses
244. See Malcolm, supra note 7, at 53.
245. McPherson, supra note 11, at 1.
246. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38–39 (2009).
247. See supra Section IV.C; see also United States v. Rogers, 804 F. 3d 1233, 1237 (7th Cir.
2015) (explaining that the statutory exception embodied in 34 U.S.C. § 20911 (2017) “contains a string
of fact-based qualifiers: ‘if the victim was an adult,’ ‘unless the adult was under the custodial authority
of the offender at the time of the offense,’ ‘if the victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was
not more than 4 years older than the victim’ . . . [t]his language doesn’t refer to elements of the offense;
it refers to specific facts of the offense”).
248. See United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Price, 777
F.3d 700, 709 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1237 (7th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d
982, 992 (9th Cir. 2008).
249. See Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 39.
250. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982).
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as falling within certain tiers; the more severe the sex offense, the higher the
tier.251 In some instances, Congress distinguished the different tiers by
distinguishing the age of the victim.252 In another provision, the catch-all,
Congress provided that a sex offense requiring registration under the law
includes offenses involving “[a]ny conduct that by its nature is a sex offense
against a minor.”253 Additionally, Congress provided statutory exceptions for
SORNA’s requirements, writing that an offense is not a sex offense under
SORNA if it involved “consensual sexual conduct” as long as the victim was
an adult not “under the custodial authority of the offender,” or “if the victim
was at least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than
the victim.”254
What seems quite clear from these provisions is that Congress was
particularly concerned with child predators and sought to keep them on a
shorter leash than other types of sex offenders.255 Seven of eight listed tier II
offenses are sex offenses committed against minors or involving minors in
some way.256 Moreover, two of the four listed tier III offenses are sex offenses
committed against minors,257 while another cites to another statutory section
that covers certain sex offenses committed against children.258

251. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(2)–(4) (2017).
252. See id. § 20911(3)(A) (emphasis added) (classifying one as a tier II sex offender if he
committed one of several listed offenses against a “minor,” i.e., a person under the age of
18); id. § 20911(3)(B)(i)–(ii) (classifying one as a tier II offender if his underlying offense
“involves . . . use of a minor in a sexual performance [or] solicitation of a minor to practice
prostitution”); see also id. § 20911(4)(A)(ii) (classifying one as a tier III sex offender if he committed
“abusive sexual contact . . . against a minor who has not attained the age of 13 years”);
id. § 20911(4)(B) (classifying one as a tier III sex offender if his underlying offense “involves
kidnapping of a minor”).
253. Id. § 20911(7)(I).
254. Id. § 20911(5)(C).
255. Of note, the definition of a tier I sex offender is simply “a sex offender other than a tier II
or tier III sex offender.” Id. § 20911(2).
256. See id. § 20911(3). These offenses run the gamut from sex trafficking of a minor to abusive
sexual contact against a minor to “production or distribution of child pornography.” Id. The only tier
II offense that does not specifically involve offenses against or involving minors is the last listed—one
that “occurs after the offender becomes a tier I sex offender.” Id. § 20911(3)(C). This provision, like
a similar one in § 20911(4)(C) which classifies one as a tier III sex offender if his offense “occurs after
the offender becomes a tier II sex offender,” seems to embody Congress’s concern with sex offender
recidivism.
257. See id. § 20911(4)(A)(ii), (B).
258. Id. § 20911(4)(A)(i) (as described in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c)).
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All in all, Congress articulated its intent quite clearly through its statutory
language: it “cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenders against children as
possible.”259 In several instances, Congress spoke in fact or conduct-specific
language to effectuate this intent, classifying sex offender into different tiers
based on things such as the age of their victims or the specific conduct
underlying their convictions.260 Therefore, the text and purpose of SORNA
lean in favor of permitting courts to engage in circumstance-specific inquiries
with respect to those provisions speaking to the defendant’s underlying conduct
or the facts of the conviction.
B. Practical Considerations
Generally, applying a categorical approach is a much simpler endeavor than
applying a circumstance-specific approach (or a modified categorical approach,
for that matter) because all a court needs to do for the categorical approach is
perform a one-to-one comparison between the elements of the statute of
conviction and the elements of a generic federal offense.261 What’s more, the
categorical approach “promotes judicial and administrative efficiency by
precluding the relitigation of past convictions in minitrials conducted long after
the fact.”262 In those cases where the Supreme Court held that a categorical
must apply, it did so in part on the recognition that “sentencing judges have
limited time, they have limited information about prior convictions, and—
within practical constraints—they must try to determine whether a prior
conviction reflects the kind of behavior that Congress intended its proxy . . . to
cover.”263
A circumstance-specific approach, on the other hand, can be complex. It
requires courts to spend their already limited time and resources digging
through sometimes inaccurate and sometimes quite old documents in search of
some fact that will tell them what the defendants being sentenced actually did,
rather than what they plead guilty to or were convicted of at an earlier date.264
Such a process could prove quite cumbersome for sentencing courts. And it
would likely require these courts to establish some sort of process for getting a
hold of a wide array of records such as guilty pleas, court transcripts, or

259. United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010).
260. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)–(4), (7).
261. See supra Section III.A.
262. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 200–01 (2013).
263. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2263 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
264. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 270 (2013); see also Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2263
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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indictments to find the missing fact, some of which might only be available in
paper form.265 This could prove difficult, for example, for a federal court in
Delaware attempting to examine such records from a conviction that occurred
in a Wyoming state court. Therefore, this factor favors requiring a categorical
approach rather than a circumstance-specific approach with respect to statutory
comparisons under SORNA.
C. Sixth Amendment Concerns
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees all criminal
defendants the right of a jury trial.266 What’s more, as the Supreme Court has
held, any fact—other than that of a prior conviction—that increases a
defendant’s penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum for
a crime must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.267 At the same
time, however, the Supreme Court has also held that a judge may apply a
penalty enhancer based on facts admitted by the defendant, such as those
admitted in a guilty plea.268 But if Sixth Amendment protections are to be
triggered, the penalty at issue must be punitive, or criminal, in nature.269 A
purely “civil” penalty will not trigger Sixth Amendment protections.270
When determining whether a penalty imposed by a statutory scheme
demands Sixth Amendment protections (as well as other procedural rights
afforded by the Constitution to criminal defendants), the threshold question is
thus whether the penalty is civil or criminal in nature.271 To make this
determination, courts will apply what’s known as an “intent-effects test.”272
265. See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 125 (2009) (abrogated on other grounds by
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)).
266. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
267. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see also Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999) (noting that “under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that
increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt”).
268. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004).
269. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (stating that “the protections provided by
the Sixth Amendment are available only in ‘criminal prosecutions’”).
270. Id. at 253–55.
271. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003); Ward, 448 U.S. at 248–49; Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
272. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92; see also Eric French, Comment, Dodging Due Process: How
United States v. Dodge Pushes the Limits of Civil Regulation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 161, 169 (2011).
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This requires first an examination of the legislature’s intent in enacting the
statute—if it clearly intended for the penalty “to impose punishment,” then the
statute is criminal.273 “If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory
scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the
statutory scheme is ‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the
legislature’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.”‘274
Second, in assessing whether a regulatory scheme is so punitive as to render
it criminal in nature, courts will apply a set of factors provided by the Supreme
Court (the Mendoza-Martinez factors). These factors include:
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as
punishment[,] whether it comes into play only on a finding of
a scienter, whether its operation will promote traditional aims
of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned.275
The Mendoza-Martinez factors are simply a “list of considerations,” and
they are not intended to be either “exhaustive []or dispositive.”276 In other
words, not all need be applied for court to find a law punitive or non-punitive.
While the Supreme Court has not applied the intent-effects test to SORNA
specifically, it has done so to a similar statutory scheme enacted in Alaska in
Smith v. Doe.277
1. Smith v. Doe
In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court ruled that a statewide sex offender
registration system was non-punitive.278 Smith involved a pair of sex offenders
who—although convicted of their respective crimes, released from prison, and
having completed rehabilitative programs before the passage of the law at
issue—were nevertheless required to register as sex offenders by an Alaska sex
offender registration and notification law.279 They challenged the law on Ex
Post Facto grounds, arguing that the law constituted retroactive punishment,
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
Id. (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49).
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168–69.
Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
Smith, 538 U.S. at 92–93.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 91.
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and the Court therefore confronted the issue of whether this law was civil or
criminal in nature.280
After applying five of the Mendoza-Martinez factors,281 the Court
concluded that the registration requirements of the Alaska law were not punitive
and thus did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.282 While
this was an influential decision by the Supreme Court, it should be noted that
the Court in Smith was only addressing whether that statewide law’s
registration requirements were punitive; the Court openly stated that it was not
addressing whether prosecuting a sex offender for failure to comply with those
requirements was punitive.283 Since deciding Smith, and in the few instances
where the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of sex offender
registration laws, the Court has not addressed the constitutionality of either
SORNA’s registration requirements or the federal criminal offense under
Section 2250(a), which enforces those requirements.284 What’s more, over the
years the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Smith has come under some
criticism.285
280. Id. at 91–92.
281. See id. at 97–105 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963)).
The Mendoza-Martinez factors applied in the Court’s analysis were whether the sanction at issue
(mandatory registration of sex offenders) (1) had been historically regarded as punishment, (2)
constituted an affirmative disability or restraint, (3) promoted the traditional aims of punishment,
retribution or deterrence, (4) was rationally related to the law’s non-punitive purpose, and (5) was
excessive compared to its non-punitive purpose. Id. The Court found that the registration requirements
did not resemble any historical forms of punishment enough to render it punitive, that it did not cause
those subject to it to experience any more of a disability or restraint than they would have otherwise
due to their criminal records, that any deterrent effects of the law were mere consequences of its stated
purpose of protecting the public, that it was rationally related to that non-punitive goal of protecting
the public, and that forcing sex offenders to register was not excessive in relation to its non-punitive
goal. Id.
282. Id. at 105–06.
283. See id. at 101–02 (noting that although “[a] sex offender who fails to comply with the
reporting requirement may be subjected to a criminal prosecution for that failure . . . any prosecution
is a proceeding separate from the individual’s original offense. Whether other constitutional objections
can be raised, and how those questions might be resolved, are concerns beyond the scope of this
opinion.”).
284. See generally Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (holding that North
Carolina’s registration law, which prohibited sex offenders from accessing social media, violated the
First Amendment); Connecticut DPS v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (dismissing a Fourteenth Amendment
due process challenge to a Connecticut registration law).
285. See Logan, supra note 6, at 427–28; see also id. at 428, n.10 (citing McKune v. Lile, 536
U.S. 24, 34 (2002) (“The characterization [that the rate of recidivism for sex offenders is ‘frightening
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2. Assessing the Punitiveness of the AWA
Does prosecuting and imprisoning a sex offender under Section 2250 for
failing to comply with SORNA constitute “punishment” and thus trigger the
protections of the Sixth Amendment for that sex offender? Recall that the Sixth
Amendment will not be implicated if the statute at issue is civil rather than
punitive, or criminal, in nature.286 Therefore, to properly determine whether the
sanction imposed is civil or criminal, we must apply the intent-effects test.287
Again, the first step is to determine whether Congress clearly intended the
statute at issue to be punitive.288 If so, then no further analysis is required—it’s
punishment, and Sixth Amendment protections are triggered.289 But if
Congress’s intent was to enact a civil statute, we must determine whether the
law’s effects are so punitive to render it effectively criminal.290 The MendozaMartinez factors provide a “useful framework” for analyzing the law’s
effects.291
But an important issue crops up before these tests can be applied: What,
exactly, is the law that must be analyzed under these tests? SORNA probably
should not be analyzed alone because the defendant’s sentencing will be for a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), a separate statutory section.292 The question
thus becomes whether the statute to be examined is simply § 2250(a) (i.e., the
provision which makes a sex offender’s failure to register a federal crime), or
if it is the entirety of AWA, including both SORNA (which provides the
registration and notification requirements under the law293) and § 2250(a), in
this circumstance.

and high’], which has long served as a staple basis to justify SORN laws, was based on a 1986 article
published in Psychology Today, in which the authors claimed that the recidivism rate of sex offenders
was as high as 80%. The assertion has since been abandoned by the article’s authors, and belied by
social science research showing that while certain subgroups of sex offenders do recidivate at relatively
higher rates, as a group sex offenders recidivate at considerably lower rates than many other criminal
offenders.”); Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman, “Frightening and High”: The Supreme Court’s Crucial
Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 495, 508 (2015)).
286. See supra Section V.C.
287. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92–93.
288. See id. at 92.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. Id. at 97.
292. 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2016).
293. See SORNA, OFFICE OF SEX OFFENDER SENT’G, MONITORING, APPREHENDING,
REGISTERING, AND TRACKING, https://www.smart.gov/sorna.htm [https://perma.cc/9HWN-U7HU].
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While § 2250(a) is a criminal statute in the U.S. criminal code that carries
with it the penalty of imprisonment,294 that statutory section remains one part
of a broader statutory scheme—the AWA.295 Therefore, § 2250(a) should not
be considered alone for the purposes of this analysis. Importantly, § 2250(a)
relies upon definitions provided by SORNA to give its elements effect.296 For
example, an individual cannot be convicted under § 2250 unless he was first a
sex offender required to register under SORNA, and to determine whether a
defendant fits SORNA’s definition of a “sex offender,” one must consult
another provision of the AWA, 34 U.S.C. § 20911, which defines a “sex
offender” and the separate tiers of sex offenders for the purposes of SORNA’s
registration requirements.297 Therefore, because § 2250(a) was enacted as
Section 141(a)(1) of the AWA and is clearly part and parcel of a larger statutory
scheme, it should be considered in light of the entirety of the AWA.298
To reiterate, the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Doe is not controlling
on the issue of whether this statutory scheme is punitive. First, Smith was only
concerned with Alaska’s sex offender registry, not a national registration
system like SORNA, and it came down three years before the AWA’s
enactment.299 But more importantly, the Smith court only addressed the issue
of whether the law’s registration requirements were punitive, specifically with
respect to individuals whose sex offenses occurred before its enactment.300 It
did not address whether prosecuting someone for failing to register under such
294. See Corey Rayburn Yung, One of These Laws is Not Like the Others: Why the Federal Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions, 46 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 369, 392 (2009).
295. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (AWA), Pub. L. 109–
248, § 141(a)(1), 120 Stat. 587, 602 (2006).
296. An individual will violate 18 U.S.C. § 2250 if he meets three elements: (1) he is required to
register as a sex offender under SORNA; (2) he travels across state lines or in foreign commerce “or
enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian country”; and (3) after doing so, he knowingly fails to register or
update his sex offender registration. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(1)–(3); see also Kane, supra note 14, at 49.
297. See generally 34 U.S.C. § 20911 (2017).
298. See AWA, §141(a), 120 Stat. at 602. This is an important point to make because, were 18
U.S.C. § 2250(a) to be analyzed standing alone, it would unquestionably be punitive in both intent and
effect. Because that statute imposes the penalty of imprisonment upon anyone convicted of violating
it and because it is situated in the U.S. criminal code, it is punitive on its face. See Yung, supra note
294, at 392–96 (arguing, contrary to my point, that § 2250(a) should be analyzed alone for punitive
intent and effect); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (“If the intention . . . was to impose
punishment, that ends the inquiry.”).
299. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 89.
300. Id. at 92.
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a law was punitive—in fact, the Court expressly said that it was not addressing
that issue.301 Therefore, we must apply the intent-effects test to determine
whether prosecuting someone for failing to comply with SORNA’s registration
requirements constitutes punishment and thus triggers Sixth Amendment
protections for the defendant.302
In terms of the statutory scheme itself, Congress stated, in the law’s
“Declaration of purpose,” that it created “a comprehensive national system for
the registration of [sex] offenders” “[i]n order to protect the public from sex
offenders and offenders against children, and in response to the vicious attacks
by violent predators.”303 That purpose resembles the purpose of the law
analyzed by the Supreme Court in Smith, which also involved “protecting the
public from sex offenders.”304 And like the law at issue in Smith, the AWA
established a registration system to further its stated purpose of protecting the
public.305 Furthermore, like the AWA, the Alaska law in Smith had some of its
provisions contained within the state’s criminal code, but the Court concluded
that that did not “support a conclusion that the legislative intent was
punitive.”306 It follows, then, that Congress’s intent behind enacting the AWA
cannot be punitive simply because it placed provisions such as § 2250(a) in the
U.S. criminal code. As a result, it appears that Congress intended the AWA to
be regulatory rather than punitive, but that does not end the inquiry; we must
next consider whether the AWA, although regulatory in intent, is punitive in
effect.307
If one were examining simply the registration requirement imposed upon
sex offenders by the AWA through SORNA, then one might reach a similar
conclusion as the Court did in Smith v. Doe. But if a statutory scheme operates
to prosecute someone for a federal crime and sentences them to imprisonment,
it looks significantly more criminal in nature than civil. Three of the MendozaMartinez factors clearly illustrate this.
301. See id. at 101–02 (noting that although “[a] sex offender who fails to comply with the
reporting requirement may be subjected to a criminal prosecution for that failure, . . . any prosecution
is a proceeding separate from the individual’s original offense. Whether other constitutional objections
can be raised, and how those questions might be resolved, are concerns beyond the scope of this
opinion.”).
302. See French, supra note 272, at 168–71.
303. 34 U.S.C. § 20901 (2017).
304. Smith, 538 U.S. at 93 (quoting 1994 ALASKA SESS. LAWS ch. 41, § 1).
305. 34 U.S.C. § 20901 (stating that “[i]n order to protect the public from sex offenders and
offenders against children,” Congress “establishe[d] a comprehensive national system for the
registration of those offenders”).
306. Smith, 538 U.S. at 95.
307. See id. at 92.
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First, the AWA imposes an affirmative disability or restraint upon sex
offenders when it imprisons them for failing to comply with its registration
requirements. As the Court noted in Smith, when analyzing whether a law
imposes an affirmative disability or restraint one looks to “how the effects of
the [law] are felt by those subject to it,” and further, it stated that “the
punishment of imprisonment . . . is the paradigmatic affirmative disability or
restraint.”308 And if a sex offender is convicted under § 2250(a) of failing to
register under SORNA, then he faces at minimum one year309 and up to ten
years imprisonment.310 So thus far, this law looks like it imposes an affirmative
disability or restraint when sex offenders are criminally prosecuted for failing
to comply with it.
But on top of imprisonment, sex offenders undoubtedly face other
affirmative disabilities or restraints due to their status. While the Court in Smith
found that there was “no evidence that the [Alaska law] has led to substantial
occupational or housing disadvantages for former sex offenders that would not
otherwise have occurred,”311 there today exists plenty of evidence that sex
offenders experience high rates of homelessness, housing instability, and
problems finding employment as a collateral consequence of being a registered
sex offender.312 Furthermore, registered sex offenders often are at increased
risk of being targeted by vigilantism once their community is notified of their
registration status.313 Although the Court in Smith argued that the consequences
308. Id. at 99–100.
309. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(e).
310. 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2016).
311. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100.
312. See Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1810–12 (2012); French, supra note 272, at 169–70; Joseph L.
Lester, Off to Elba! The Legitimacy of Sex Offender Residence and Employment Restrictions, 40
AKRON L. REV. 339, 350–55 (2007); Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender
Residence Exclusion Laws, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1, 17–22 (2006); Wayne A. Logan, Database Infamia:
Exit from the Sex Offender Registries, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 219, 222 (2015); Mary Helen McNeal &
Patricia Warth, Barred Forever: Seniors, Housing, and Sex Offense Registration, 22 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 317, 320 (2013); Stephanie N. K. Robbins, Comment, Homelessness Among Sex Offenders: A
Case for Restricted Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
205, 222 (2010); Richard Tewskbury & Matthew B. Lees, Sex Offenders on Campus: University-Based
Sex Offender Registries and the Collateral Consequences of Registration, 70 FED. PROBATION 50, 54
(2006).
313. See Alex B. Eyssen, Comment, Does Community Notification for Sex Offenders Violate the
Eight Amendment’s Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment? A Focus on Vigilantism
Resulting from Megan’s Law, 33 ST. MARY’S L. J. 101, 103–05, 115–17 (2001); Lara Geer Farley,
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such as these stem “from the fact of conviction” rather than that law’s
“registration and dissemination provisions,”314 it is clear that registration itself
at least magnifies some of these difficulties.315 Thus, even without being
imprisoned for failing to register, sex offenders face many negative collateral
consequences as a result of the AWA’s requirements. Overall, however, when
the AWA operates through § 2250(a) to imprison a sex offender for up to ten
years for his non-compliance with SORNA, it clearly constitutes an affirmative
disability or restraint.
Second, the sanction imposed on sex offenders who run afoul of SORNA’s
registration requirements has historically been regarded as punishment. As
noted in Smith, “a State that decides to punish an individual is likely to select a
means deemed punitive in our tradition.”316 The means selected by Congress
when enforcing the AWA’s requirements against sex offenders is
imprisonment, a sanction that our history and traditions have long considered
punishment.317 As a result, when the AWA’s provisions result in the
imprisonment of a sex offender who failed to comply with SORNA’s
requirements, it is punishing that sex offender by traditional means of
punishment.
Third, the sanction imposed promotes the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution and deterrence. Unlike in Smith, where the Court found that
deterrence was merely a byproduct of the registration requirement at issue
rather than its focus, retribution and deterrence are clearly the purpose behind
the penalties attached to the AWA for a sex offender’s failure to comply with
SORNA. A key purpose behind Congress’s creation of the failure to register
crime in § 2250(a) was its concern over the risk posed by transient sex
Note, The Adam Walsh Act: The Scarlet Letter of the Twenty-First Century, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 471,
493 (2008); French, supra note 272, at 170; Jacob Frumkin, Perennial Punishment? Why the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act Needs Reconsideration, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 313, 352 (2008).
314. Smith, 538 U.S. at 101.
315. See, e.g., Farley, supra note 313, at 491–94 (noting that the AWA’s registration
requirements lead to sex offenders having difficulties finding housing and employment, and the
community notification requirements results in offenders receiving threats, having their homes
vandalized, being ostracized from their communities, and facing harassment and violence. All of this
can lead to sex offenders becoming homeless and transient, which may result in them failing to update
their registration on time.).
316. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
317. Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 352 (1886) (“[W]e cannot doubt that at the present
day imprisonment . . . is an infamous punishment. It is not only so considered in the general opinion
of the people, but it has been recognized as such in the legislation of the [s]tates and [t]erritories, as
well as of Congress.”); Yung, supra note 294, at 397 (“In reviewing § 2250(a), . . . a court should
recognize the rather obvious point that a sentence of up to ten years in prison is historically,
traditionally, and currently regarded as punishment.”).
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offenders, who could move freely from a state where they might be required to
register to another with less stringent (or non-existent) registration
requirements.318 Congress thus sought to deter this practice by punishing those
sex offenders who engaged in it with imprisonment.319 Furthermore, the prison
sentence an individual sex offender faces for a violation of § 2250(a) depends
upon his tier classification, which is retributive in that it takes into account his
prior sex offense(s) in sentencing them.320 And the sex offender’s tier
classification will merely constitute his base offense level under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines321—he can have his sentence enhanced based on
additional retributive sentencing factors such as his criminal history category.322
As a result, enforcing the failure to register provision of the AWA against a sex
offender promotes both deterrence and retribution.
These three Mendoza-Martinez factors clearly indicate that while Congress
may have intended to create a regulatory statutory scheme when it enacted the
AWA, the law is effectively punitive when it is used to prosecute and imprison
non-compliant sex offenders. Therefore, sex offenders should be afforded
Sixth Amendment protections when being prosecuted and sentenced to
imprisonment under § 2250(a). What’s more, different tiered sex offenders
face different maximum penalties, with the maximum penalty increasing for
each tier a sex offender moves up.323 This all suggests that courts, when
determining sex offender tier levels for sentencing purposes, should refrain
from making their determinations based any facts that have not been found by
a jury or admitted by the defendant.324 As a result, Sixth Amendment concerns
lean in favor of requiring courts to apply a categorical approach, rather than a
318. See supra Section V.A.
319. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2016).
320. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (“The heart of the retribution rationale is
that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.”).
321. See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5 (2016).
322. See id. § 4A1.1.
323. See id. § 2A3.5(a)(1)–(3). Recall that when considering base offense levels alone, a tier I
sex offender faces a maximum of 16 months’ imprisonment, a tier II sex offender faces a maximum of
21 months, and a tier III sex offender faces a maximum of 27 months. 34 U.S.C. § 20915(a)(1)–(3)
(2016). Thus, the finding that a defendant is tier II or tier III sex offender, as opposed to a tier I sex
offender, “indisputably increases the maximum penalty.” See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S.
254, 269 (2013) (noting that such a finding “would (at the least) raise serious Sixth Amendment
concerns if it went beyond merely identifying a prior conviction”).
324. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
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circumstance-specific approach, when a court is sentencing a sex offender to
imprisonment for a violation of § 2250(a).
D. Courts Should Apply a Restricted, Circumstance-Specific Approach in
SORNA Cases
Of the three factors examined above, the one that most strongly favors a
circumstance-specific approach is Congress’s intent in enacting the law, as
evidenced by SORNA’s text, structure, and legislative history.325 The practical
concerns with the circumstance-specific approach, however, favor a categorical
approach, which promotes judicial efficiency by limiting the time and resources
sentencing courts expend on examining documents for missing facts.326 And
generally speaking, employing a circumstance-specific approach to find facts
that will ostensibly affect a sex offender’s ultimate sentence by slotting them
into a particular tier raises Sixth Amendment concerns, which counsels against
the use of such an approach in that scenario.327
To address this divide, courts should employ a novel approach, a “restricted
circumstance-specific approach.” This approach would allow sentencing
courts to examine certain facts underlying a defendant’s prior offense of
conviction but in a way that respects the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights
and acknowledges the practical difficulties with requiring sentencing courts to
engage in unrestricted fact-finding.
In other words, even though two of the three factors examined here favor a
categorical approach (or at least lean against an unrestricted circumstancespecific approach), sentencing courts should not be required to employ a strict
categorical approach when determining a sex offender’s tier classification.
Doing so would run counter to Congress’s clear intent that sex offenders who
committed crimes against minors face more stringent requirements under
SORNA and more severe penalties when they violate these requirements.328
This intent is evidenced both in Congress’s declaration of purpose that it sought,
through this law, to protect the public, and minors especially, from sex
offenders,329 and in its use of fact-specific language in distinguishing what
crimes fall under what tier of sex offenses.330 From the language it employed
in SORNA, Congress clearly intended to subject sex offenders whose criminal
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

See supra Section V.A.
See supra Section V.B.
See supra Section V.C.
See supra Section V.A.
34 U.S.C. § 20901 (2017).
See supra Section V.A.
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history involved certain conduct committed against minors to higher scrutiny
under this law, and it illustrated this intent by differentiating sex offenders tiers
by reference to underlying facts such as their victims’ age.331
What’s more, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence expressly allows a
criminal defendant’s maximum penalty to be increased based on facts admitted
by the defendant.332 Such facts, if they exist, can likely be found in any Shepard
documents available from the prior conviction, such as a plea agreement, a plea
colloquy, or “some comparable judicial record of this information.”333
But an issue crops up here—these documents can generally only be
consulted under the modified categorical approach, i.e., for the purpose of
determining which of several “crimes” listed in a divisible statute the defendant
actually committed.334 At the same time, however, the Supreme Court came to
that conclusion in the context of ACCA after analyzing the same three factors
addressed in this Section—the statute at issue’s text and legislative history,
practical concerns with employing a circumstance-specific approach, and Sixth
Amendment issues raised by the circumstance-specific approach.335
Importantly, the statutory text and legislative history of ACCA is not the same
as that of SORNA. The Court even contrasted ACCA’s text with that other
statutes where Congress had indicated its intent “to increase a sentence based
on the facts of a prior offense.”336 SORNA is just that sort of statute, where
Congress clearly sought to slot sex offenders into certain tiers—each with its
own sentencing consequences—based on facts such as whether the offenders’
victims were under the age of thirteen or whether offenders’ crimes involved
any conduct that was by its nature a sex offense against the minor.337 Unlike
with ACCA, where Congress used language which suggested that it “intended
the sentencing court to look only to the fact that the defendant had been
convicted of crimes falling within certain categories,”338 Congress used
language in drafting SORNA that suggests it wanted courts to consider certain
331. See supra Section V.A.
332. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004).
333. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005); see supra Section III.B.
334. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 263–64 (2013).
335. Id. at 267.
336. Id. at 267–68 (citing Nijhawan v. Holder 557 U.S. 29, 36 (2009)) (“If Congress had wanted
to increase a sentence based on the facts of the prior offense, it presumably would have said so; other
statutes, in other contexts, speak in just that way.”).
337. See supra Section V.A.
338. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990).
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facts underlying prior convictions when determining sex offender tier
classifications and subjecting those sex offenders to the sentencing
consequences of their respective tiers.
All the same, because the Sixth Amendment demands that courts cannot
consider facts other than those found by a jury or admitted by the defendant
when sentencing a sex offender under § 2250(a),339 sentencing courts should be
restricted in what documents they may examine for making tier determinations.
Unlike in the immigration context, sentencing courts here should not be
permitted to examine documents such as police reports, pre-sentencing reports,
and affidavits when trying to discover whether a sex offender’s victim was
under the age of thirteen, for example. Instead, they should be required to
examine more reliable Shepard documents to try to find these facts. If, for
instance, a sex offender admitted in a plea deal or plea colloquy that his victim
was twelve-years-old, then that is a factual admission within the bounds of the
Sixth Amendment,340 and a sentencing court should be permitted to use that
admission to declare the defendant a tier III sex offender and sentence them
accordingly. This unique, restricted circumstance-specific approach will thus
give effect to Congress’s intent, as expressed through the statutory text and
legislative history of SORNA, while at the same time respecting a defendant’s
rights under the Sixth Amendment that no facts other than that of a prior
conviction or those admitted by them will be used to increase the maximum
penalty he would otherwise face for failing to comply with SORNA’s
requirements.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress created SORNA to establish a national sex offender registration
and notification system in the hopes that such a system would protect the public,
and children in particular, from sex offenders.341 While courts should generally
employ a categorical approach when engaging in statutory comparison,
Congress’s use of fact-specific and conduct-focused language throughout
SORNA indicates its intent that, for the purposes of determining a sex
offender’s tier classification and sentencing them based on that classification,
courts should employ a circumstance-specific approach that will allow them to
examine the conduct underlying the sex offender’s prior conviction.342 Without
such an approach, courts in many cases would not be able to examine such facts
339.
340.
341.
342.

See supra Section V.C.
See Blakey v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004).
See supra Section V.A.
See supra Section V.A.
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as the victim’s age or whether the underlying offense involved “any conduct
that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.”343 This may result in
someone who would otherwise be classified as an upper tier sex offender to
instead be classified as a tier I offender or, worse, not subject to SORNA’s
registration requirements at all.344 This result would be counter to Congress’s
intention that the law cover “as many offenders against children as possible.”345
At the same time, prosecuting a sex offender in federal court
under § 2250(a) for failing to comply with SORNA’s registration requirements
clearly constitutes punishment, and such a prosecution would therefore trigger
Sixth Amendment protections for the defendant sex offender.346 A sentencing
court, therefore, should not be allowed to engage in an unrestricted fact-finding
effort to determine which tier properly fits the conduct underlying the
defendant’s prior offense.347 Rather, if the statutory language at issue suggests
to a court that it may look beyond the bare elements of the prior offense to the
conduct underlying that offense, Sixth Amendment concerns suggest that the
court should look no further than those facts admitted by the defendant in the
prior proceeding.348 This new approach, a restricted circumstance-specific
approach, would thus serve to both acknowledge Congress’s intent behind the
law and uphold the Sixth Amendment rights that all criminal defendants are
guaranteed.
JOHN F. HOWARD*

343. See supra Section IV.B.
344. See supra Section IV.B.
345. See supra Section V.A.
346. See supra Section V.C.
347. See supra Section V.D.
348. See supra Section V.D.
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